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CONGESTION CHARGING ZONES: 
 
POLICY FEEDBACK LOOPS IN LONDON AND NEW YORK CITY 
 
ALLEGRA ROSE LONG 
ABSTRACT 
 Cities provide a unique landscape for policy experimentation, especially within 
the realm of environmental policymaking. This thesis explores two case studies of 
congestion pricing: London’s successful implementation under Mayor Ken Livingstone 
in 2003 and New York City’s failed implementation under Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 
2008 through the scope of policy feedback loops. These instruments are comprised of 
inputs and outcomes between three main variables: policy entrepreneurship, widely-
distributive policies, and political context, which includes partisan support, emergence 
and influence of organized opposition, and a policy fit-to-problem variable. This thesis 
proposes a general policy feedback loop that summarizes the aforementioned variables’ 
interactions in London, and an additional internal, temporal addition to account for New 
York City’s initial failure in 2008 and later success in 2019. Through qualitative research 
methods and interviews, this thesis applies a popular environmental science mechanism 
as a way to explore urban environmental policy change and hopefully improve policy 
development processes to anticipate and counteract emerging challenges.   
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 We are defined by our creations. Our innovation built the tallest skyscrapers and 
the deepest subways. We crafted automobiles, designed cities around them. Our legacy is 
all around us, but there is a cost to our progress. As we exploit natural resources and burn 
them for energy and production, our climate changes, our ice sheets melt, our oceans rise. 
Our machines pollute the air we breathe. There will always be policies we did not choose 
that may have made things better for us in our path forward. With more than 68 percent 
of the world’s population projected to live in cities and surrounding areas by 2050, our 
cities will have to grow (UN 2018). As they grow, we have the opportunity to grow with 
them through urban environmental policymaking. David Miller, former Mayor of 
Toronto, captures this sentiment well: “A history of activist policies combined with 
effective actions is embedded in the history and DNA of cities,” (Miller 2020, 18).  
Cities provide the perfect opportunity to create long lasting change. Our legacy 
rests on whether we act, which this thesis generally addresses. Our first steps to adapting 
and pioneering the way for the future of urban environmental policymaking lies in how 
we move around our cities. Every year, Americans spend 4.2 billion hours and waste 2.9 
billion gallons of fuel sitting in traffic (Odioso and Smith 2014). 4.2 billion hours that 
could be spent with loved ones or exploring natural spaces. Vehicle combustion 
emissions plague our cities with air pollution and contribute to asthma in children, among 
other health impacts (Guarnieri and Balmes 2014). Many of the world’s urban public 
transportation institutions suffer from underfunding and debt, unable to encourage a shift 




instruments that place a cost on using vehicles and distribute the revenue into public 
transportation infrastructure improvements are catching the eye of city officials. 
A congestion charge is one of these instruments. Congestion charging, or pricing 
as it is more commonly known as in the United States (US), is a toll that drivers must pay 
in order to use a road. This thesis focuses on the substantive adoption or non-adoption of 
cordon toll congestion zones, which are determined areas of a city’s central business 
district (CBD) that drivers must pay a fee to enter or drive within. By increasing the cost 
imposed on individuals, drivers are discouraged from driving into and within the zone, 
therefore decreasing traffic congestion and with it, emissions. Throughout this thesis, I 
will use the terms: “congestion charge,” “congestion pricing,” and “congestion charging 
scheme,” interchangeably. The same can be said for “congestion charging zone,” and 
“congestion zone.” Previous scholars have explored congestion pricing and its 
applications in economic and environmental lenses, but there are political science 
questions at play that have not been adequately explored. Following successful passage 
of schemes in Singapore, Stockholm, London, and a handful of other cities around the 
world, urban and environmental policy experts have used case study-based analyses to 
explain why congestion pricing succeeded in some cities and failed in others. I use this 
same approach but focus on London and New York City (NYC), with a focus on policy 
feedback loops and how each variable interacts with the others. 
London and New York City were chosen for a few reasons. They are competing 
global cities with democratic governance, with comparable populations: New York City 




system has an annual ridership of 1.65 billion, is made up of 24 lines and 468 stations, 
and spans 659 miles of track. In London, 1.2 billion people ride the tube annually, 
throughout its 270 stations and 249 miles of track, (Schmalbruch, 2015). The cities share 
an interesting link in Bob Kiley, who ran the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA) in NYC before he was recruited by Mayor Livingstone to be the first TfL 
commissioner in 2001 (Travers and Hendy 2016). In 1995, Kiley became president and 
CEO of the New York City Partnership, the same business coalition that eventually 
proposed congestion pricing to Mayor Bloomberg. Their timelines of proposing 
congestion charges are also similar, with London’s 2001 proposal and New York City’s 
2008 proposal. This exploration does not hold all the answers to urban congestion pricing 
schemes. It is a starting point to understanding how policy feedback loops play a role in 
policy introduction and development. 
This thesis extends previous literature on congestion pricing, policy entrepreneurs 
and their use of issue redefinition, distributive policies, and the influence of organized 
opposition by exploring each within the context of a larger, policymaking feedback loop. 
These cases involve long term gains to unidentified people in the future and short-term 
costs to motorists now, a common theme in climate change policy. By identifying these 
variables’ role in policy development in the years following the scheme’s success or 
failure, this thesis sheds light on the specific conditions that ultimately answer the 
question of under which policies will individuals allow themselves to be subject to short-




CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
 In this section, I explore the literature surrounding congestion charging and short-
term costs in pursuit of long-term benefit policymaking in general, before diving into the 
literature on each of my proposed variables that explain London’s success and New York 
City’s failure: political entrepreneurship, the policy’s distribution of benefits, and 
political context.  
Existing work has generally agreed that political entrepreneurship, widely-
distributive qualities of the policy, and political context are important factors in 
successful adoptions of congestion pricing, even in its earliest applications (Phang and 
Toh 2004; Hårsman and Quigley 2011). Phang and Toh (2004) explored the first cordon 
toll application of congestion pricing, the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme in 1975, and 
argued its success could be attributed to physical and social factors, namely it being a 
small island easy to test policy with a population of law-abiding citizens. Hårsman and 
Quigley (2011) focused on Stockholm, the only city to implement congestion pricing by 
means of a successful citizen referendum, emphasizing the role of political preferences 
on how citizens voted. However, these authors have not considered deeply enough how 
the variables influence each other and their interaction’s role in the overall outcome. A 
feedback loop exists, in which the aforementioned variables not only interact with each 
other but depend on each other. I will explore this in the Theory section.  
Congestion Charges 
The congestion charge has early roots in economist Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 




allow carriages to pass over a bridge (1776, 561). The tax or toll that the consumer pays 
would be calculated in proportion to the carriage weight, as to calculate the impact its 
crossing has on the bridge itself. Therefore, the consumer pays for the maintenance of the 
public bridge in proportion to their use of it. A new dimension was added by economist 
Arthur Pigou in 1920. Pigou’s publishing of The Economics of Welfare, noted a similar 
tax or toll as a means to encourage use of one road over another in order to cut down on 
aggregate travel time (1920). F.H. Knight mentioned the concept in his 1924 work Some 
Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, suggesting that if the government levied a 
tax on each vehicle on one of two theoretical roads, the number of vehicles on the taxed 
road would be reduced to the point at which the cost of using said road, including the 
factored-in tax, would equal the cost of using the other road (1924, 585). Economists in 
the 1960s built out these ideas by applying different economic theories to them. In 1961, 
Walters applied theories on private and social costs to ways to alleviate the recently 
developed highway congestion in the United States through a fuel tax, supplemented by 
mileage taxes for more congested areas. Vickrey went so far as to develop his own 
scheme that included his invention of equipping all cars with an electronic identification 
tag to be scanned by roadside equipment to form a cordoned area (1963, 458). These 
foundational pieces are essential for understanding where this policy came from, and 
where it could go in the future. However, as these works were developed and written by 
economists, congestion pricing has really only been understood as an imposition of cost 
and a distribution of benefits. Something to note is that in much of the literature, tolls are 




as a whole is usually considered a way to change behavior while generating revenue to 
provide for that change in behavior through public infrastructure improvements. These 
earlier works do not necessarily paint the whole picture as we may know it in more 
modern contexts, as they leave out much of the policymaking processes that are involved 
and instead focus on the financial instrument itself. They are useful for understanding 
congestion pricing, but not necessarily how it comes to fruition. 
 In more recent years, the literature has focused on analyzing actual and potential 
applications in numerous cross-national contexts (Bae and Richardson 2008, Chapter 3, 
11; Noordegraaf et al. 2014), as well as political viability and risk associated with 
proposing such a scheme (Bae and Richardson 2008, Chapter 19; Chronopoulos 2012). 
Some authors, such as former Mayor of Toronto David Miller, have focused on the 
potential capacity of congestion pricing policy to alleviate negative environmental and 
health impacts associated with traffic congestion in dense, urban areas (Miller 2020; Bae 
and Richardson 2008, Chapter 9-10). There has been a gradual shift in focus from using 
congestion pricing as a solution to traffic congestion to using it as a solution to urban air 
pollution. As it is a relatively new real-world application of policy, some political 
scientists have explored congestion pricing through case studies but not in a way that 
emphasizes the interaction between variables as the “why” behind its success. Previous 
authors have focused on the right factors and their influence, but not as much within the 
larger time context, as Jacobs mentions. In this thesis, I aim to reflect the complexities of 
real-world feedback loops with as much context as possible. In terms of deeply exploring 




the greater feedback loop and therefore how each variable influences each other, I aim to 
provide a broader view into adopting urban environmental policies. 
In practice, concern surrounding congestion has coincided with greater public 
concern for climate change, a field where cities are able to act when federal entities may 
not. Real-world applications of this policy share common variables that may provide 
answers for policy change. With every deep dive into a variable, however, comes the risk 
of falling short of the entire picture. Environmental policymaking is inherently complex 
and interactive. Bae and Richardson’s 2008 book Road Congestion Pricing in Europe, 
comes close to addressing this by bringing together essays which touch on topics 
surrounding congestion pricing, such as effects on air pollution and translating U.K. 
policies to U.S. policies. In this work, however, each author argues for the importance of 
their own variables as opposed to the greater power they have in interaction. 
 Ho and Maddison’s (Bae and Richardson 2008, Chapter 10) chapter provides an 
environmental view, exploring how the “London Congestion Charge Zone,” or LCCZ, 
has affected air quality in London. Previous research by Maddison found that particulate 
air pollution traced back to motor vehicle emissions, causes 10.8 percent of respiratory 
hospital admissions in the city. Although lowering emissions was a secondary aim of the 
original policy, the authors found that the scheme lowered air pollution in the zone by 
10.72 percent (Bae and Richardson 2004, Chapter 10). A later chapter by Lee suggests 
certain factors that could lead to a successful transfer of congestion charging policy from 
London to U.S. cities. Lee argues that political risk is the main reason why congestion 




political will and planning (Bae and Richardson 2004, Chapter 11).  One of the final 
chapters in the book, written by King, Manville, and Shoup, examines political advocates 
for congestion pricing and their role in its success. Their main argument is that the real 
difficulty in implementing congestion pricing is persuading the public to accept it in the 
first place, as opposed to realization of its value after the fact (Bae and Richardson 2008, 
Chapter 19). This collection of essays sheds light on many important variables in 
successfully implementing congestion pricing, and yet, none of them respond to each 
other nor evoke a greater sense of interaction of these variables. Without exploring the 
relationships between these variables, we run the risk of missing unique phenomena 
associated with the institutional structure of cities, key actors and why they act in certain 
ways, and perhaps an understanding of what drives individuals to bearing cost for 
something that may not benefit them for a long time.  
 Many of the studies in this realm build upon essential variables to consider in 
these cases, but on their own, fail to address larger feedback loops that are at play. For 
example, Chronopoulos’s study surrounding political viability stresses the importance of 
benefit redistribution as both a factor for scheme acceptability and political support 
(2012). Looking at London, Stockholm, and New York City, this study attributes 
adoption to introducing congestion pricing alongside increased spatial mobility schemes. 
It fails to acknowledge the role of key actors’ institutional jurisdiction in implementing 
policy. A study that gets closer to providing the full picture is Noordegraaf, Annema, and 
Wee’s 2014 content analysis of 106 papers on congestion charge schemes. They identify 




pricing in certain cases, the most popular of which were political and public support for 
the scheme, (Noordegraaf et al. 2014). My thesis fits nicely alongside Noordegraaf et al. 
by providing a deeper look into two cases, one adoption that developed well and one non-
adoption. This thesis follows a similar path as these previous works in identifying and 
exploring what I believe to be the most important factors in a successful congestion 
charge policy. However, I add temporal and interactive dimensions in the form of a 
policy feedback loop in which the following variables exist and interact with each other 
constantly as to present more of a real-world, complex view into congestion pricing. 
Short-term Costs in Pursuit of Long-term Benefits 
Developing and adopting policies like congestion pricing that ensure benefits for 
future generations is not easy. Before jumping into the London and New York City cases, 
it is important to gain a sense of the underlying theme of congestion pricing: convincing 
people to pay a cost now to receive benefits in the future. Policies that provide immediate 
returns are more appealing, as people know that they will benefit while bearing cost. 
However, in climate policy, there is usually not enough information to fully convince 
cost-bearers that they will eventually benefit. An example of this kind of trade-off could 
be drinking carbonated water as opposed to soda, the water is much better for long-term 
health but still provides the carbonation that soda does. In climate policy, this could be 
implementing a carbon tax, encouraging a shift to renewable energy sources as to earn 
both the immediate benefit of not having to pay the tax and the long-term benefit of 
cleaner air. Gonod explores the complications and uncertainty associated with this 




uncertainty associated with decisions made in the past and present, and uncertainty 
associated with those of the future. There are things we still cannot explain that exist in 
the past and present, and there will be more in the future. This confusing relationship is 
unfortunately the basis for climate policy and poses a significant challenge to convincing 
people with little climate knowledge to bear costs. To counter this, Gonod urges climate 
policymakers to be flexible and develop new strategies to manage political risk (1996).  
We need to think bigger about tackling the current nature of climate 
policymaking. To gain support from the general population, there needs to be both short-
term and long-term rewards to encourage participation in the face of uncertainty. The 
short-term application of cost in order to change behavior to encourage more long-term 
benefits will work only when individuals are given enough of a short-term benefit to 
outweigh that cost. I will refer to this strategy as: “temporal policymaking.” 
Jacobs (2011) brings the most substantial view on temporal policymaking to the 
literature, arguing that timing and specifically this cost weighing by governments is often 
overlooked. Political scientists usually weigh policy options by their social costs and 
benefit distribution, not by potential consequences. What stands in the way of 
governments making short term investments with long term reward? Jacobs argues three 
main factors: lacking information on long-term outcomes, changing democratic political 
power structures and the inability to commit to long-term actions, and subjecting 
organized groups to costs (Jacobs 2011). While focusing more on variability in these 
decisions, Jacobs helps us understand these main conditions’ intricacies. Some costs may 




economic and individual behavior (Jacobs 2011). When costs are easier to hide, their 
associated political risk may lessen. The most important aspect of Jacobs’ work to this 
thesis in particular, is his brief exploration of policy feedback and his questioning of 
whether there are: “circumstances under which long-term policy commitments become 
self-enforcing, and hence ex ante credible to elites and publics, by virtue of predictable 
downstream effects on the behavior and preferences of social actors,” (Jacobs 2011, 447). 
In this thesis, I aim to start building a foundation to explore these conditions by 
investigating further development of two congestion pricing cases. Jacobs provides a 
strong foundation for thinking about policy feedback, but it needs to be built upon with 
clear evidence.  
 Finnegan (2019) builds off of Jacobs’ ideas of government weighing short-term 
costs with long-term benefits but focuses on the perspective of politicians in investment 
in environmental policymaking. Finnegan argues that politicians are driven to do 
whatever it takes to be re-elected, so their assessment for imposing short-term costs on 
constituents must be preceded by having a low risk of losing their political office 
(Finnegan 2019). While helpful in building out the literature on cross-national climate 
policies, Finnegan does not recognize the unique ability of cities to be able to implement 
and test policy with more flexibility than federal structures. This is especially evident in 
the political entrepreneurship that some mayors are able to utilize alongside regulatory 
powers and jurisdiction that other officials may not have. Politicians are generally driven 
by re-election and will make sure their policies at least seem acceptable to their 




better term, strong-armed the congestion charge into implementation in 2003. This thesis 
addresses this in the Cases section.  
The rest of the Literature Review explores the current literature on three important 
variables present in both the London and New York City cases.  
Political Entrepreneurship 
Political entrepreneurship is a key factor in London and New York City’s cases as 
such an ambitious policy requires someone to champion it in ways that will increase its 
chances of public acceptance, without endangering the entrepreneur’s position. Sheingate 
(2003) identifies political entrepreneurs as those who frame and define issues, serve as a 
source of innovation in policy creation and design, and create lasting change on their 
environments, their policies, and institutions. Perhaps the most well-known exploration 
of policy entrepreneurs and issue redefinition was authored by Baumgartner and Jones, 
who speak on the policy image created by entrepreneurs, made of both: “empirical 
information and emotive appeals,” (Sheingate 1993, 26). To them, issue redefinition is 
not simple nor always possible, putting some space between their analysis and the 
dramatic success stories that Riker (1986) and Kingdon (1984) explore. Baumgartner and 
Jones also acknowledge a similar point that Polsby (1984) notes in his earlier work, the 
idea that entrepreneurs need to keep timing at the forefront of their minds and use issue 
redefinition to turn events into necessary “crises,” as a framework for their policy 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 168-170). These authors hint at context being an important 
factor in policy entrepreneurs finding success, but their arguments come short in the 




issues, they need a policy that is realistic politically and practically. The policy 
entrepreneur either invests resources in the creation of a new policy or champions an 
existing one to benefit themselves in pursuit of achieving their own legacy, or re-election. 
Both paths require a policy to bring some benefit to certain groups. While the policy 
entrepreneur may be able to convince the public of benefits to come, many groups may 
respond well to a short-term or immediate concession to show that the policy 
entrepreneur is accountable and willing to take legitimate action, thus addressing 
Gonod’s aforementioned ideas of uncertainty. This is especially relevant in democratic 
governance structures as regular changes of leadership encourage policymakers to bring 
benefits during their term to increase their chances of re-election. 
Widely-distributive Policies with Immediate Benefits 
Widely-distributive policies with both immediate benefits and long-term benefits 
can provide assurance for policy entrepreneurs. If people benefit sufficiently from a 
policy, they may be more likely to accept being subject to associated costs. The literature 
surrounding these kinds of policies emphasizes the communication of “winners” and 
“losers.” Brick et al. (2018) reviewed this communication style across numerous issues 
such as health, climate change, and more, and suggested aspects of policy options that 
make communication difficult. They identify four main challenges to successful policy 
communication: policy impacting groups in different ways and deciding how to 
communicate that to the general population, numerous outcome options with scales that 
are difficult to compare, long timescales that may impact future generations differently, 




entrepreneurs thinking about communication and by proxy, issue redefinition, but so 
much of the variables Brick et al. focus on are decided by the context in which they are 
operating (2018). For example, some uncertainty of a policy’s actual effect may have to 
do with how well the policy may fit the problem, as well as buy in from cost-bearing 
groups.  
Further, policies themselves must have well-defined distributive aspects, in order 
to prove to the public that they will benefit in some way. Saiz (1999) utilizes a cross-
national study to explore and test mayoral perceptions related to Peterson’s (1981) model 
of city policies. Peterson’s (1981) model divides all policies into three types: 
developmental, redistributive, and allocative. Saiz argues that this is applicable to U.S. 
mayoral policymaking, and mayors prefer to participate in developmental policy over 
social spending policy. This study finds statistically significant differences between the 
types of policies implemented in the U.S. but overall, only analyzes the patterns from 
eight countries in total (Saiz, 1999). This study does not include the U.K. As it was 
published in 1999, its research period preceded the establishment of the London mayoral 
position. Perhaps an extension of Saiz’s work could be an analysis of Mayor 
Livingstone’s early years as a test to see if Paterson’s model continues to hold up in the 
beginning of the 21st century. While congestion charging may not be a perfect policy, it 
provides a unique example of how to test the prospects of taxing consumers and 
distributing generated revenue to public transportation, thereby benefiting both 
consumers who change behavior by not needing to pay the tax and others who bike, walk, 




improve public services while shifting behavior to practices with much better, long-term 
environmental outcomes. 
Political Context 
There is not very much literature on political context as a whole, with many 
authors rather focusing on key aspects of surrounding actors in policy decision making, 
such as veto players and interest groups. These provide a helpful sense of what makes up 
the broader environment of policy change overall and set the stage for the Case Studies.  
A key idea is the existence and behavior of veto players. Veto players are defined 
as: “individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective 
actors) is required for a change of the status quo,” (Tsebelis 1995, 289). They are similar 
to policy entrepreneurs, but require decision making authority. Some policy entrepreneurs 
can be veto players, but not all. This allows for a perspective on policy change that 
includes the institution itself, specifically its legislative means, and the actors that 
influence its path: mainly those that support and oppose it. Veto players in cities range 
from mayors themselves to broader interest groups or entities who may have influence 
over legislation or policy. This includes the Democratic majority in the State Assembly 
presiding over a key vote and the High Court who decided upon a challenge to 
congestion charging, as this thesis explores in New York and London, respectively. 
Tsebelis surveys factors relating to regime type, legislature type, and party system not in 
isolation, but in respect to the possibility of policy change (1995). Focusing only on 
policy stability across systems, Tsebelis argues that with more veto players comes higher 




changing with the replacement of players dwindles as opposed to systems in which one 
veto player holds all decision-making power. While impressive, Tsebelis’ framework is 
too broad to apply to urban cases as decision making on a local scale may be influenced 
by higher levels of institutional power. In London’s case, the Mayoral position was such 
a new entity that Ken Livingstone had a unique opportunity to set a precedent and 
therefore was less constrained by his former party’s preference, who held a majority in 
the central government. The Labour Party could be considered a veto player, yet they 
chose not to challenge Livingstone. Tsebelis also refers to higher stability associated with 
more policy entrepreneurs, and yet congestion charging has proven to be a stable policy, 
continued throughout multiple mayoral terms of varying party affiliations (1995). 
Perhaps Tsebelis’ theory works for broader frameworks of governance, as opposed to city 
structures, where more variability may be found. Congestion pricing also may be an 
outlier in policy change theories, in that it is based in consumer-based costs and diffuse 
benefits, making it less attractive to many policy entrepreneurs and veto players for fear 
of lower public acceptability and therefore, their own position of power.  
In the same 1993 work in which they explore policy entrepreneurship, 
Baumgartner and Jones explore another facet of policy change theory: interest groups. 
They refer to roles that interest groups play, such as linking and influencing public 
opinion, forming questions, and: “defining the terms of debate,” (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993). These groups can be political parties, business coalitions, or other groups 
organized to some degree. Organization and mobilization are key to successful interest 




Potential groups opposed to policies such as congestion pricing may take the form 
of citizen groups or others. In much of the literature on the intersection of interest groups, 
sustainability, and urban politics, cities are seen as an opportunity for policy 
experimentation. Given their “low barriers to entry,” city politics are easy to get involved 
in and therefore provide a testing ground for innovative environmental policies (Berry 
and Portney 2013, 2080). Interest groups both benefit from this, as it is easier to influence 
local politics, as well as suffer, as more groups are able to join and attempt to gain power. 
Other authors argue that even with lower costs to entry, commercial interest groups often 
dominate city politics (Molotch 1976).  
Even with their complicated field of actors, cities also offer benefits such as 
decentralized institutions that help solve issues local to their population (Camagni et al., 
1998). With that in mind, there has been a large emphasis on sustainable policies that are 
associated with economic growth and development, as to incentivize participation from 
interest groups. Cities have a lot of different opportunities for action but there needs to be 
both representation and buy-in from numerous sectors. While authors like Molotch 
(1976) would call commercial interests the most powerful group in a city, congestion 
pricing puts direct costs on the consumer. Policy entrepreneurs need to be able to juggle 
multiple interests, as we will see in London and New York City.   
This cross-sector approach is often riddled with challenges such as varying 
priorities, strategies, and willingness to change behavior (Camagni et al. 1998). Policy 
entrepreneurs need to incentivize organized opposition groups, or nothing will change. 




associated interest groups and their behavior in local policymaking. When a political 
leader has the power to implement a policy without needing to cater to the opposition’s 
interests, they likely will. Camagni et al. do not account for power structures and policy 
entrepreneur influencing abilities, therefore signaling the need for a broader policy 
feedback loop argument that shows how different variables influence each other and the 





CHAPTER THREE: Theory & Hypothesis 
Theory 
In this thesis, I will explore the phenomena of how urban voters are convinced to 
accept being subject to short-term costs, such as a congestion tax, in the path towards 
long-term benefits, a better future climate, within the context of environmental 
policymaking in cities. Congestion charging zones are an example of a broader form of 
policy change, as policy entrepreneurs work within political contexts, against organized 
opposition, to create and communicate policies with widely-distributive benefits that 
seemingly fit the problem they were meant to solve. If policy entrepreneurs are successful 
in their issue redefinition and persuasive in their communication of benefits to the public, 
then voters are more likely to accept the short-term cost of a toll on cars entering a certain 
area of the city. However, policy change does not occur in a vacuum, meaning it is 
influenced by numerous variables, some more obvious than others.  
Each of the studied variables falls into a congestion charge policy feedback loop. 
Policy entrepreneurs, driven by re-election and leaving a legacy, participate in policy 
framing and issue redefinition in order to champion policies. They then make sure that 
the proposed policy has, or at least seems like it has, sufficiently distributive benefits for 
the general public and communicate that in a clear and effective way. Political context 
surrounds each actor, ranging from jurisdictional powers of the entrepreneur, to the 
emergence and strength of organized opposition and its influence on the policy’s 
legislative pathway. These factors impact each other, and the feedback loop brings us 




and they reap the political benefits, will then be encouraged to introduce more of these 
kinds of policies. This echoes the temporal policy feedback loop aspect of this research, 
which I argue was present throughout these cases.  
Baumgartner and Jones’ Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics section 
serves as a foundational framework for this idea, arguing that: “a positive feedback 
mechanism includes a self-reinforcing process that accentuates rather than 
counterbalances a trend,” (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 15). The self-reinforcing process 
in congestion pricing is made up of each of the variables in this thesis. The political 
context determines key actors in the struggle for power and re-election. Policy 
entrepreneurs are those key elected politicians, driven constantly by the thought of re-
election, who face organized opposition groups in a struggle for power. They will 
redefine issues to fit their goals and spread benefits to enough of their constituents to earn 
their favor. If successful, these benefits are brought back into the policy itself, inspiring 
similar developments in the future. 
My proposed feedback loop focuses on policy entrepreneurs but also defines their 
interaction with the actors around them including the public, organized opposition, and 
their proposed policy itself. I propose that Mayor Bloomberg and Mayor Livingstone 
were New York City and London’s respective policy entrepreneurs, both driven by 
thoughts of re-election and leaving a legacy, leading them to operate by redefining 
congestion in a way that fits their proposed policy. Bloomberg focused on environment 





 These policy entrepreneurs worked to ensure that their proposed policy included 
benefits for the public, before communicating them skillfully to appeal to the public. 
Both New York City and London’s proposals included increased capacity for public 
transportation, specifically much-needed infrastructure improvements in NYC and more 
buses on the roads in London, to make up for the cost imposed on road users. Both were 
similar strategies, where the cost-inducing congestion charge was balanced by short-term 
benefits associated with less traffic, as well as long-term benefits like funding for 
infrastructure repairs and less air pollution. Bloomberg’s congestion charge proposal was 
one of 127 initiatives in a broader improvement strategy called PlaNYC, whereas 
Livingstone’s mayoral Transport Strategy, a document required by the GLA Act, 
included congestion pricing in central London as one of 11 key proposals. Both included 
short-term benefits, such as increased bus capacity and simply less traffic congestion. 
Livingstone communicated these benefits much more succinctly than Bloomberg, who 
usually focused on the long-term benefits of congestion charge-generated revenue. 
Policies with more direct and short-term benefits will be more likely to gain approval 
from the public both for initial implementation and continued success, as consumers are 
rewarded both in the short-term and eventually the long-term.  
To combat challenges of information, which Baumgartner and Jones call: 
“imperfect, costly, and asymmetric,” policy entrepreneurs need to emphasize these short-
term benefits, (2015, 44-45). Members of the public are generally not experts in public 
policy, nor urban environmental policy, and therefore choose to defer to the expert’s 




Policies with diffuse benefits carry similar sentiment in spillover effects to the policy 
entrepreneur who championed them. Policy entrepreneurs will benefit from the 
legitimacy a successful, popular policy provides. 
 Finally, I explore the variable I call “political context,” which helps account for 
most of the variability between the two case studies, defining the details of the policy 
feedback loop. Political context is made up of two sub-arguments, first: the political 
context of the policy entrepreneur, specifically their mayoral jurisdiction to implement a 
congestion charging scheme in their city, whether or not they have partisan support, and 
if they need an issue to champion to help re-election chances or forming a well-defined 
legacy. It is possible to apply the broad meaning of Tsebelis’ theory to New York City 
and London by associating veto power with jurisdiction, specifically within the context of 
the policy entrepreneur in each case. This thesis argues that jurisdiction over policy 
decision making is a key aspect of the political context variable and later implementation 
(Tsebelis 1995). In New York City, Mayor Bloomberg needed approval from three 
governmental entities to impose such a scheme. He had recently changed from the 
Republican Party to become an Independent and was up for re-election the following year 
in 2009. In London, Mayor Livingstone had jurisdiction over implementation of the 
scheme due to powers invested in the position from the Greater London Authority Act of 
1999. Following the loss of the Labour nomination, he campaigned as an Independent 
and had the chance to create a legacy as the first Mayor of London. Another facet of this 
variable is the economic well-being of each city’s transportation authority, as congestion 




more support for the policy entrepreneur who introduced it. In New York City this would 
be the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), and in London, Transport for 
London (TfL).  
The second sub-argument is the emergence and strength of organized opposition, 
as well as their influence on the legislative pathway of the policy itself. Organized 
opposition in NYC took the form of New York State Assembly Democrats, who held a 
majority in the chamber and did not allow the scheme to come to a vote. In London, it 
was mainly the Conservative Party members and the Westminster City Council, who 
attempted to block the scheme legally, but the Labour-controlled central government 
were not proponents of the scheme.  
Additionally, I propose a “policy-fit-to-problem” variable, which alludes to the 
less theory-related aspects of policymaking, such as financial constraints of institutions 
and who exactly would bear the cost and or benefit from congestion charging. I place this 
within the political context variable. I explore the financial stability of the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (MTA) in 2008 to understand if a strong revenue-boosting 
program would have a noticeable effect and note Transport for London’s (TfL) 
absorption of previous related agencies’ debts and what expectations TfL had for the 
charge.  
In analyzing the policy feedback loop of each case, I also explore policy legacy, 
meaning not only the outcome of these proposals but whether anything similar was 
proposed in the years since and its success. This ultimately shows that the policy 




successful implementation in London in 2003, additional policies were introduced 
surrounding vehicle emissions such as the Low Emissions Zone and Ultra Low Emission 
Zone, the former introduced by Conservative Mayor Boris Johnson and the latter by 
Labour Mayor Sadiq Khan. In New York City in 2019, congestion charging was passed 
as part of a state budget bill following severe financial constraints of the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority. This was spearheaded by Governor Andrew Cuomo and Mayor 
Bill de Blasio in a rare collaboration. These developments raise questions of the 
importance of partisan support, instead shifting focus towards a true understanding of the 
challenge that climate change and urban growth pose, and how to take effective action.  
Hypothesis 
A priori, I believe that the variables that led London to succeed, and New York 
City to fail, included: effective and flexible policy entrepreneurs who championed the 
policy, clarity of benefits the policy would provide and how that was communicated to 
the public, and the political context. These are not mutually exclusive, instead these 
variables fall into a feedback loop in which the variables interacted in a way so that 




CHAPTER FOUR: Methods 
In order to ascertain the differences between London and New York City’s 
respective congestion charging schemes, I used archival research as well as qualitative 
data from interviews and email conversations with individuals either involved in or very 
familiar with the cases. I examined mayoral press releases and communications, 
newspaper articles, related academic articles, and city and agency reports to fully 
understand each case.  
To assess the role of policy entrepreneurs in the success or failure of the scheme, I 
examined the Mayor’s Office’s press communications in New York City and published 
Minutes from Greater London Assembly meetings during which the Mayor's Question 
Time occurred. In these published records, I noted how the mayors tried to sell their 
policy and convince the public to allow its implementation. I also analyzed how they 
attempted to redefine the charge by focusing on environmental or social benefits 
associated with lower congestion. 
To determine the distributive aspects of the policy, I read the proposed policies 
themselves and associated reports to understand if it was part of a broader transportation 
strategy that would increase public transportation capacity as to provide short-term 
benefits to make up for the cost. To gain a better sense of an economic comparison 
between the two proposed policies, I read public transportation financial and budget 
statements for Transport for London and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority to 
determine how much money was being put into public transportation at the time of the 




numbers would provide the first step in understanding how these policies were 
realistically posed to benefit the public in each city.  
To measure the aspects of political context, I used archival research including 
members of organized opposition’s comments in news articles and what they chose to 
focus on to communicate to the public. I also read institutional rules to determine their 
influence on the proposed policy’s legislative pathway, an example of which was Mayor 
Bloomberg’s 2008 proposal needing to pass in the New York State Assembly and looked 
into how much money was reported to have been raised in opposition to the scheme in 
advertisement campaigns, for example, if applicable. To measure the political 
entrepreneur’s own jurisdiction over policy, I read institutional rules and legislation 
granting such authority, such as the Greater London Authority Act of 1999. 
My interview questions reflected each of these variables and were kept open-
ended, as to encourage the interviewee to share as much of their opinion as possible. I 
asked 6-8 questions, with responses ranging from answering all questions to only 
answering a few in cases of email correspondence in lieu of a Zoom call. This provided 
an additional qualitative analysis to provide detailed perspectives on aspects of the 
implementation, or failure to, of congestion pricing schemes in the U.K. and U.S.  
In order to prove the existence of a policy feedback loop, I analyzed how each 
variable influence or plays into and is influenced by all of the other variables. These 
methods use case study evidence-based information, often published or said by official 
institutions or organizations, or officials themselves, which is exactly what was 




seriously considered and attempted in each city. Put together, as is done in each 
variable’s “Policy Feedback Loop Analysis,” in which I outline said variable’s place in 
the feedback loop, they form a complex view of what exactly happened in each case 
study and link together essential events, processes, and people that will help us 
understand why New York City failed while London succeeded. Instead of viewing these 
factors in isolation as what was different between the two cities, placing them in an 





CHAPTER FIVE: London Case Study  
At the turn of the 21st century, average speed of trips across London slowed, 
contributing to longer commutes and increased stationary time during peak periods. 
Traffic speeds fell more than 20 percent in three decades, to an average of 10 miles per 
hour in 1998 (Leape 2006). As traffic congestion became more prominent, the 
government commissioned numerous studies to examine potential solutions. Road 
charging in the United Kingdom (U.K.) was not a novel idea. In the early 1960s, the 
Macmillan government commissioned a study known as: “The Smeed Report,” which 
explored the feasibility of road pricing and what forms it could take in the U.K. (Smeed 
1964). The authors suggested a system of “daily licences,” a method eventually 
implemented in 2003, applying to all vehicles in a certain area (Smeed 1964). However, 
the technology that would allow such a scheme, “Automatic Number Plate Recognition” 
(ANPR), was not reliable nor cheap at the time (ANPR International, n.d.).   
 A later report by the Department of Transport’s London Congestion Charging 
Research Program in 1995 led to the creation of a working group called ROCOL, or 
Review of Charging Options for London. Their 2000 report proposed an “area license,” 
which would allow paying vehicles to drive in and out of the zone as much as they liked, 
as well as suggesting central London as the scheme’s location (Leape 2006). Two years 
earlier, a 1998 referendum asked London residents whether they support the prospect of 
introducing a directly elected Mayor and Assembly. It passed with 70 percent voting in 
favor, and so Parliament enacted the Greater London Authority Act of 1999. This 




Assembly to represent constituents and have the jurisdiction to implement policy in the 
city (Greater London Authority (Referendum) Act 1998). This legislation also created the 
statutory body of Transport for London, which was part of Section 141 of the Act, giving 
the Mayor of London the duty: “to develop and implement policies to promote and 
encourage safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services to, 
from and within London,” (Greater London Authority (Referendum) Act 1998, Section 
141). With that and other powers, the position of Mayor was of high interest to political 
parties.  
The major U.K. parties, namely the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, 
nominated their respective nominees for the position of Mayor, Frank Dobson and Steven 
Norris. Narrowly losing the Labour nomination, former leader of the Greater London 
Council (GLC) Ken Livingstone ran as an independent with overwhelming popular 
support. His previous stint in the Greater London Council put him at odds with the former 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who eventually dissolved the Council, and earned him 
the nickname “Red Ken,” for his socialist beliefs (BBC 2018). During his campaign in 
2000, Livingstone’s manifesto signified transportation as the highest priority for the GLA 
and Mayor (BBC News 2000). In it, Livingstone pledged a 15% reduction in traffic 
congestion by 2010 (Blow et al. 2003, 9). Following his victory, Mayor Livingstone 
stayed true to his campaign promises and consulted the public for 18 months on 
implementing a congestion charge and eventually released his own, ROCOL-based plan 




 Implemented on February 17, 2003, the London Congestion Charge (LCC) 
initially charged a flat rate of £5.00 daily for driving or parking a vehicle on public roads 
within Central London, specifically an eight square mile zone which includes the City, 
Parliament, and major tourist sites. The charge operates between 7:00am and 6:30pm, 
Monday to Friday, but excludes holidays. In its first year, 80 percent of scheme revenue, 
amounting to £80 million, was spent on bus network improvements, 11 percent on road 
safety and so on (Leape 2006). The charge has steadily increased over the years to its 
current amount of £15. Payments must be made in advance, whether that be over text, in 
retail outlets, kiosks, or the internet. ANPR technology, much cheaper and more reliable 
than in previous years, identifies who adheres to this requirement and enforces a potential 
£160 charge to those who do not pay ahead of time (Transport for London, n.d.). This 
amount reduces to £80 if the penalty is paid within two weeks and increases to £240 if 
not paid within 28 days. Exemptions include motorcycles, bicycles, buses, and taxis 
registered in London, as well as emergency vehicles (Transport for London, n.d.).  
 Three years after its implementation, Transport for London reported that the 
charge had successfully reduced traffic by 15% and congestion, or the additional time a 
trip would take due to traffic, by 30%. The report also noted that “public transport 
continues to successfully accommodate displaced car users, and bus services continue to 
benefit from significantly improved reliability and ongoing investment,” some of which 
stems from the scheme’s generated net revenues of £122 million in 2005/2006, the 
majority of which goes towards bus services (Transport for London 2006, 2). The LCC 




Low Emission Zone and the Ultra Low Emission Zone, each introduced by Conservative 
Mayor Boris Johnson and Labour Mayor Sadiq Khan respectively. These developments 
focus on the type of vehicle on the road and discern older, more polluting vehicles from 
more environmentally-friendly ones and apply an additional fee to the former as to 
encourage both increased use of public transportation as it is better for the environment 
and a shift to production of more sustainable vehicles. This thesis will explore these 
additions further as part of the policy legacy variable. Overall, the London Congestion 
Charge has been seen as a successful example of road user charging and inspired 
numerous studies of feasibility in cities around the world including San Francisco, 
Seattle, and New York City. 
Policy Entrepreneurship and Issue Redefinition 
Ken Livingstone, following the loss of the Labour nomination for Mayor of 
London, left Labour in order to create his own legacy. Known for his previous experience 
in the GLC and opposition to former PM Thatcher, Livingstone was the perfect policy 
lead for congestion pricing in London. He was a policy entrepreneur that could bring in 
this ambitious policy without the bounds of partisanship, and redefined congestion 
pricing as primarily a solution to London’s debilitating traffic congestion. Examples of 
his issue redefinition can be found in Mayor’s Question Time meeting minutes, instances 
where constituents were able to ask the Mayor questions surrounding the congestion 
charge directly. This provided an opportunity for Mayor Livingstone to be held 
accountable but also was able to redefine the congestion charge in a way that justified the 




 At a May 2000 meeting of the London Assembly, held in advance of Mayor 
Livingstone first assuming his full powers in July of the same year, the Mayor answered 
questions for two hours and thirty minutes. The very first question surrounding the 
political viability of congestion charging, asking if the Mayor believes he can carry out 
his commitment to the scheme while the Labour population in the Assembly opposed the 
scheme’s implementation for the first four years and the Conservative group opposed 
such a scheme in general. Livingstone responded, emphasizing his commitment to 
campaign promises in that: “It could be very easy to simply say that having won the 
election I have a mandate to proceed to impose the congestion charge,” (Greater London 
Authority: London Assembly 2000, 3). His tone entrenched in a sense of duty redefined 
the charge as a promise that he made to constituents, the majority of whom voted for him. 
Former Minister for Transport, and Livingstone’s Conservative opponent in the 2000 
election, Steven Norris reinforced this sentiment in our interview: “So Ken gets selected. 
And then he pulls a masterstroke because he is very, very good at this. He just said ‘Well, 
I said I was going to do this!’ And that was it, he did it,” (Norris, personal 
communication, 2020). Redefining that vote as support allowed Livingstone to propose 
implementing congestion charging as soon as possible as the people’s will and placing it 
in opposition to the two main party platforms. Livingstone broke away from the party 
structure not only in running for Mayor but also in the minds of Londoners, presenting 
himself as another option if they found themselves disillusioned with Labour and 
Conservatives.  




reasoning for proceeding with congestion charging because: “London has terrible 
problems of congestion, terrible problems of pollution and we see this as a solution,” 
(“Minutes of the Meeting of the London Assembly,” 2000, 4). Livingstone did mention 
the environment and reframe congestion pricing as just as good of a solution to traffic as 
it was to air pollution, but his statements were much more focused on traffic. By 
introducing the environment as an associated benefit but focusing on reducing traffic as 
the main benefit, Livingstone found more success as traffic was more comprehensible to 
members of the public as a direct benefit to their daily lives, therefore increasing public 
acceptability. He also noted the health benefits to less pollution, using the figure of: “one 
in seven children in [London] has asthma (Greater London Authority: London Assembly 
2000, 19). 
  Norris spoke to this method of issue redefinition, arguing that: “[If you] treat road 
charging as an environmental tool, then the risk is that I’m afraid it either becomes very 
toxic politically, or you’re not having much effect on the environment because people 
just pay [the fee],” (Norris, personal communication, 2020). By advertising the 
congestion charge as a solution for traffic, Livingstone found more success. Norris 
supports this, mentioning that there was little public outcry, as “traffic levels in those 
days were pretty bad,” alluding to the idea that the public felt that this was their last and 
only option to solve traffic congestion, (Norris, personal communication, 2020). This 
back and forth between Livingstone and the public’s willingness to adapt to his new 
policy was a key factor in why London’s congestion charge was implemented and 




how policy entrepreneurship and issue redefinition each influence the other variables and 
in turn, are influenced. This is explored in the later Policy Feedback Loop analysis.  
Widely-distributive and Associated Policies 
Following the ROCOL Report, a Greater London Authority discussion paper 
sought the perspectives of numerous stakeholders on the details of the scheme. It was 
found that the responses were soundly in support, indicating that: “six times as many 
stakeholders supported the concept of introducing a congestion charging scheme in 
central London as opposed it,” (Transport for London 2002, 5). The Commission for 
Integrated Transport, an independent entity that provided the Government with advice on 
transport policy, ran a survey that found congestion to be the: “single most important 
issue to people living in the capital,” with 72% of people surveyed calling it: “a serious 
problem in their area,” (Commission for Integrated Transport 2001). After further 
consultation with Transport for London and different organizations and numerous rounds 
of developing the details of such a scheme, the Mayor directed TfL to create a Scheme 
Order which included advice on consultation and guidance before he would introduce his 
own Transport Strategy. In July of 2001, Mayor Livingstone published said Transport 
Strategy, addressing his campaign promises, and identified ten key strategies for reducing 
congestion in London. The Strategy aimed to reduce traffic and therefore make London 
more accessible, economically prosperous, and environmentally friendly (Transport for 
London 2002). In the Strategy, Livingstone proposed improvements in public 
transportation, better enforced traffic and parking regulations, and increased capacity for 




charging scheme. Introduced as part of a broader strategy, the congestion charge soon 
garnered its own regulatory process through the Secretary of State for Transport, Local 
Government, and the Regions. This provided the scheme, and enforcement officials, the 
means for imposition of a penalty upon any vehicle deemed in violation of the charging 
scheme (The Road User Charging (Charges and Penalty Charges) (London) Regulations 
2001). Transport for London then created a scheme order titled: “The Greater London 
(Central Zone) Congestion Charging Order 2001,” as to carry out the Mayor’s Transport 
Strategy proposals. This provided the legal framework for the scheme itself and its 
implementation. London’s congestion charge was part of a larger transportation strategy, 
just like New York City’s, but the difference in distribution of benefits lay in the direct 
tradeoff between congestion charging and increased bus capacity in London, as well as 
the strong public consultation that occurred. 
To increase the likelihood of public acceptability, and in turn counter challenges 
raised by Brick et al., TfL carried out numerous rounds of public consultation. These 
included: notices published in the Evening Standard and the London Gazette, information 
packs sent to key stakeholders including Members of Parliament with constituencies in 
London and business representative groups,  public information leaflets published in 
numerous languages including Braille, and a large advertising campaign that reached 
64% of all adults in Greater London and 54% of drivers in Greater London (The Road 
User Charging (Charges and Penalty Charges) (London) Regulations 2001). Transport for 
London reportedly spent £15 million on said long-term campaign, as to promote the 




again,” (Kleinman 2002). This kind of language framed the congestion charge as not only 
the best and singular option, but also as a scheme that would benefit all Londoners, not 
just those who lived in and around the zone. It worked well enough, echoing Londoners’ 
general consensus supporting the scheme. In fact, 53% of Londoners supported the 
controversial scheme, if the generated revenue went solely to public transport 
infrastructure improvements (Commission for Integrated Transport 2001). As it was, 
Transport for London was originally allowed to introduce a congestion charge through 
the GLA Act of 1999, which also required revenue to be spent on “relevant transport 
purposes,” by either the Greater London Authority, TfL itself, or a Greater London 
Borough Council (Blow et al. 2003, 11).This may have aided in dealing with uncertainty 
of outcomes, mentioned by Brick et al., as the public would have greater reason to expect 
a long-term benefit outcome like improved public transportation networks.  
For 2003 to 2004, net congestion charging revenue was to be sent to improve bus 
networks, increase late-night public transportation options, as well as “safer streets,” 
means like the Road Safety Plan (Blow et al. 2003, 11). The numbers associated with 
these initiatives are significant, especially the £81 million, of the total expected £132 
million, allocated to bus network improvements. In theory, this meant a short-term cost 
paired with the short-term benefit of less congestion, as well as the long-term benefit of 
improvements to public transportation infrastructure. In practice, six months after 
implementation, TfL reported a 30% reduction in traffic delays within the zone, with 
journey times within and around the zone decreasing by an average of 14% (Transport for 




network capacity, London’s buses were adapting to an influx of new passengers well. 
Subsequent years were expected reach about £80 to £100 million in funding for public 
transportation improvements, far beyond the previously expected £68 million (Transport 
for London 2003). These trends continued and in TfL’s 2006 report, the charge led to a 
reduction in traffic by 15%, as well as a reduction in congestion, here defined as extra 
time a trip would take because of traffic, by 30% (2). Further discussion of the scheme’s 
development and impact can be found in the Policy Feedback Loop Analysis section. 
This is a good example of how the overall policy feedback loop needs to consider such a 
short-term benefit. The congestion charge continues to function today, in 2021, with 
numerous policy-related additions and price increases. Perhaps the key to success in this 
variable is quick and effective realization of a short-term benefit immediately after 
bearing cost, potentially cluing consumers into a greater likelihood of long-term benefits. 
Another interesting facet of London’s congestion charge is its stability throughout 
numerous mayors of different political parties following Livingstone’s term, another clue 
pointing to interactive effects of each variable and a much larger picture to explore. 
Political Context 
Political context is a vague phrase used to paint broad strokes over a complex, 
difficult to conceptualize, aspect of the congestion charge policy feedback loop. This 
thesis uses it to fill in gaps in the feedback loop, as real-world issues are complex and 
often difficult to explain by only a few variables. In reality, policy change is messy and 
confusing, a concept often hard to capture within an academic project. This thesis aims to 




thread tying the loop together. It is helpful to begin with the context surrounding the 
political entrepreneur, Mayor Livingstone himself, namely his mayoral jurisdiction over 
transportation policy in London. This includes both the institutional, official powers as 
well as whether or not they had partisan support and finally, if re-election was on the 
table or they wished to leave a related legacy. The second argument makes up the 
political context variable, including the strength and emergence of organized opposition 
to the scheme or entrepreneur. The opposition’s influence over the policy’s legislative 
pathway defines their power. In London, the main organized opposition groups to the 
scheme were the Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) and the Greater London 
Authority, especially those who ran against Livingstone in the 2000 Mayoral race. One of 
Livingstone’s rivals in that race was the former Minister for Transport Steve Norris, who 
provided invaluable material to consider as part of an hour-long interview. The final 
component of the political context variable is what I refer to as the “policy-fit-to-
problem,” variable. This attempts to fill in the gaps in the feedback loop left behind by 
the previous variables. It provides more of a concrete perspective: whether the 
entrepreneur’s argument of policy fit to problem was actually backed up by evidence, or 
if it was just talk. In London, this thesis looks at the status of TfL’s debt, compares it to 
how much the congestion charge was expected to raise, and how much was actually 
raised.  
Having already described the origins of the mayoral jurisdiction over transport 
policy, this thesis continues to build out the legal and institutional framework for Mayor 




plan to Mayor Livingstone in January 2001 (Transport for London 2007). The Mayor’s 
Transport Strategy outlined TfL’s path in consultation for the “Greater London (Central 
Zone) Congestion Charging Order,” followed by the Mayor’s Scheme Order which 
outlined both further consultation and details of the charge’s operation. An extremely 
iterative process, overall policy development took upwards of five years stemming from 
the 1997 central government Labour win, until Livingstone’s election in 2000, and 
eventual Scheme Order revisions until February 2002 in which the Scheme Order was 
finally confirmed by the Mayor and TfL secured a formal contract with Capita Business 
Services as the main operations contractor. It was not until September 2002 that TfL 
formally contacted Mayor Livingstone to confirm the scheme could begin, with all 
arrangements sorted, the following February (Transport for London 2007).   
Mayor Livingstone, while supported institutionally, operated in an interesting 
partisan context, to say the least. After losing the Labour nomination and running as an 
Independent, Livingstone used his experience and policy ideas to his advantage. He 
understood that congestion transcended politics, and it would serve him better to focus on 
that as opposed to partisan conflict. However, once Livingstone won the election, there 
was public outcry by opponents but the central government, who would be able to pass 
legislation adjusting the jurisdiction of the Mayor, stayed relatively quiet.  
Answering another question during the Mayor’s Question Time event mentioned 
previously, Livingstone also capitalized on a sense of urgency in solving congestion, 
asserting that “getting the congestion charge right,” was the biggest issue facing the GLA 




that if it worked, it would: “become the pattern for changing transport usage throughout 
cities, throughout the country, most probably spreading to cities all over the Western 
world,” (Greater London Authority: London Assembly 2000, 36). He continued, “No 
other city of this size has introduced something like congestion charge. If we get it wrong 
it will set the whole process back by a decade,” (Greater London Authority: London 
Assembly 2000, 36). Livingstone rounded out his answer by pointing to health and 
economic impacts of congestion, again framing the charge as a necessary and effective 
tool to make London healthier and more efficient. While another example of 
Livingstone’s masterful issue redefinition, this answer provides evidence of his desire to 
leave a legacy. If this key aspect of his campaign for mayor was not only implemented 
but worked, Livingstone would benefit immensely. He would not only be the first Mayor 
of London, but a worldwide leader in transportation policy, a principal figure in the fight 
against climate change, a hero to Londoners and Brits worldwide. In referring to other 
cities with their own congestion challenges, Livingstone creates space for environmental 
policy to be at the forefront of urban politics around the world.  
An important aspect of the policy’s development and context was the strength and 
emergence of organized opposition. In London, an obstacle to the congestion charge’s 
success was not the Conservative Party or the Labour Party, but the organized opposition 
of the Westminster City Council, who brought forward a legal case against the zone’s 
implementation. Supported by several other local councils, they hoped to block the plan 
and argued mainly that the scheme would cause air pollution to rise immediately outside 




majority on the Westminster City Council so partisan differences were not missing 
completely from this case. They also argued against the empirical foundations of the 
scheme in that the air pollution immediately outside the scheme could move into the 
charging zone, offsetting the scheme’s benefits (Bae and Richardson 2004, Chapter 10). 
While a warranted concern, TfL called the Westminster City Council’s case 
“misconceived,” referring to the 18 months of public consultation already undergone 
(The Guardian 2002). The High Court ultimately dismissed Westminster’s application for 
review, which Livingstone and his administration argued the immense public 
consultation played a role in (CNN 2002).   
Another early opponent of the scheme and the Conservative Party-backed 
Mayoral candidate, Steve Norris, reflected upon his own friendly relationship with 
Livingstone and asserted that the issue was less about the idea of introducing a charge 
and more about the details of the scheme (Norris, personal communication, 2020). 
Congestion was such a big problem that not only were Londoners willing to be subject to 
a toll, but their political representatives from opposing parties agreed enough to allow an 
Independent Mayor to implement it. Norris even noted the flexibility of his own 
Conservative ideology surrounding the scheme, noting his idea that: “as strange as it is 
for me coming from the right to say this, but it’s an incredibly regressive tax,” (Norris, 
personal communication, 2020). An unexpected sentiment from a Conservative 
politician, but it speaks to the complexities and importance of solving London’s traffic 
problem. Livingstone, Norris argues, never seemed to worry about opposition to the 




jurisdictional powers as well as Livingstone’s own character and experience working in 
London politics. Norris summarized Livingstone’s approach: “You know, he said, ‘I said 
I was going to do it, so I’m going to do it. And if you didn’t catch me saying that, then 
you should have paid more attention.’ I think [that] was Ken’s view of life,” (Norris, 
personal communication, 2020).  
While most importantly used to lessen traffic congestion, the scheme’s long-term 
benefit was generating revenue for public transportation capacity building and 
infrastructure improvements. In order to understand if the policy actually solved relevant 
problems, it is essential to understand the financial capacity of Transport for London to 
achieve those long-term benefits. At the time, Transport for London was a new entity 
with minimal debt and a relatively small operation. As TfL grew, as did its debt, which 
rose by £1.95 billion over the course of Mayor Livingstone’s 8-year career as Mayor 
(Mansfield 2020). The scheme was projected to raise £121 million in net revenue per 
year, small in comparison to the overall debt, but a good start in improving public 
transportation capacity and infrastructure that was explored in the Widely-distributive 
and Associated Policies section. Given the immense debt of TfL and this significant new 
stream of revenue, following political controversy over the private company-led 
investment attempt, congestion pricing looked like a concrete option at that time. Another 
feature of political context is how many Londoners actually drove cars and would be the 
ones bearing cost, in order for the scheme to succeed. In 2003, only 60% of households 
owned cars, while over 80% of people preferred to use public transport for their 




“why” behind congestion pricing in the first place: only a small group of drivers who 
actually drove into the zone would bear the explicit cost, yet the majority of Londoners 
who used public transportation would benefit from long-term public transportation 
improvements. Further, if fewer people drove in the zone as to avoid the toll, those who 
continued to bear the cost would benefit from less traffic. This is where the policy 
feedback loop coincides with short-term costs and benefits, in pursuit of long-term 
benefits. 
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London Policy Feedback Loop Analysis 
In this policy feedback loop, we start with the policy entrepreneur: Mayor Ken 
Livingstone (see Figure 1). Livingstone used framing and issue redefinition to introduce 
congestion charging both in his campaign for Mayor and as a clear priority to deliver in 
his first term as Mayor. By holding Mayor’s Question Time and working with Transport 
for London to create public relations campaigns, among other activities, Livingstone 
communicated both short-term benefits, like less traffic in the central business district, 
and long-term benefits, namely public transportation capacity and infrastructure 
improvements, to the public. The public, being very familiar with just how bad traffic 




congestion charging both in his campaign for Mayor and as a clear priority to deliver in 
his first term as Mayor. By holding Mayor’s Question Time and working with Transport 
for London to create public relations campaigns, among other activities, Livingstone 
communicated both short-term benefits, like less traffic in the central business district, 
and long-term benefits, namely public transportation capacity and infrastructure 
improvements, to the public. The public, being very familiar with just how bad traffic 
was in London as they experienced it every day, was therefore more amenable to making 
associated behavioral changes. Their realization of how the benefits could improve their 
routine played into their acceptability of the policy. If they then experienced these 
benefits and made the connection between the policy entrepreneur and the policy, by 
seeing TfL notices or reading about Mayor’s Question Time, they might then thank 
Mayor Livingstone by means of re-election or simply think of him as creating a 
respectable legacy on London’s transportation system. However, there are a few more 
variables feeding into public acceptability, especially political context. Within political 
context, there is an inherent struggle between Mayor Livingstone’s legal jurisdiction to 
implement such a policy and organized opposition’s influence over communication of 
drawbacks to the policy, in lieu of much influence over the legislative pathway. This is 
where we see the Westminster City Council lawsuit, which essentially only made some 
noise and was soon forgotten following its High Court dismissal. The Conservative Party 
is also included in this variable as they lacked power and majority, as Labour, who were 
not strong proponents of the policy yet did not dislike it enough to act, made up the 




Independent with the public’s trust, the scheme may not have been even entertained due 
to its political risk. While this allowed Livingstone to not be limited by party leaders 
looking to appeal to more people, it also gave opponents of the scheme a singular enemy 
to place blame on publicly, even if they privately accepted the scheme. The policy itself, 
with its costs and benefits, was seen as a last resort to change London’s traffic problem, 
known and understood well by the public. Public acceptability is also informed by the 
policy-fit-to-problem argument, wherein TfL desperately needed money for 
improvements and Londoners desperately wanted less traffic congestion. Their cost-
weighing was inherently individual-based, so car owners would view this charge 
differently than those who commuted by public transportation, and the latter significantly 
outweighed the former. These variables and their respective interactions form the 
feedback loop that Mayor Livingstone played an integral role in, but also relied on for his 
own benefit as the champion of a successful policy. London’s example teaches us that 
policy implementation is messy and complex, and often involves many more people and 
factors than it seems. In the end, the congestion charge worked: congestion decreased and 
Livingstone enjoyed reelection.   
 The scheme’s success continues today, having undergone developments and 
additions such as the Low Emission Zone and the Ultra Low Emission Zone. Not only 
has the charge increased gradually to its current rate of £15, but the Low Emission Zone, 
implemented by Livingstone in his last term in 2008, applied restrictions and charges to 
lorry drivers in London (Transport for London, n.d.). Any lorry, or truck to American 




air pollutants, and those who did not had to pay £200 each day to enter central London 
(PRWeb 2008). His successor, Conservative candidate Boris Johnson, repealed a zone 
extension and froze rate increases, and as a result, congestion began to slowly increase. 
However, he did support the LEZ implementation. London’s current mayor, Labour’s 
Sadiq Kahn, has overseen an attempt to reach zero emissions while reducing pollution 
and congestion through an ambitious transport strategy. His goals include all London 
vehicles reaching zero emission by 2050, aided by zero-emissions zones, and areas which 
restrict fossil-fuel cars. In 2019, Mayor Kahn introduced the Ultra-Low-Emissions Zone 
(ULEZ), which covers the entire congestion zone but runs 24/7 (Miller 2020). The 
ULEZ, like the LEZ, applies only to emitting vehicles that enter the zone, charging an 
additional ₤12.50 on top of the congestion charge. One difference between the LEZ and 
ULEZ is that the former applies to heavier vehicles like trucks and buses, while the 
ULEZ applies to lighter, more polluting vehicles (London City Hall 2021). Electric 
vehicles are exempt, and some discounts are available for taxis, residents, and so on 
(Miller, 2020). The zone is expected to expand to much of Greater London on October 
25, 2021 (Transport for London, n.d.).  
 The scheme itself still has its critics, including one Steve Norris, who still point 
out its imperfections such as problems of equity, where wealthier residents may think 
much less of paying the daily charge than those with lower incomes living and working 
in one of the most expensive cities in the world. Norris points out the amount of the 
charge as going: “up from five pounds to eight pounds, [and] didn’t make any 




became less about actually changing behavior for long-term environmental benefits, and 
more about making money. Perhaps Norris was right, that this scheme was never directly 
about the environment, but its encouraging developments cannot be ignored. Congestion 
charging is not our final solution, but a step towards understanding how to approach such 
a massive problem. To this point, while public opinion on London’s congestion charge 
was around 40% in support in December 2002, after implementation, it raised to 59% in 





CHAPTER SIX: New York City Case Study  
Speaking in front of guests at the “State of the City” address in April 2007, 
recently re-elected Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed a sweeping, 127-initiative plan 
to create a “greener, greater New York,” (The City of New York 2007). Following 
months of City Hall discussions, looping in the environmental and business communities, 
the Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability soon developed the 25-
year plan connecting air, energy, water, and transportation, known as PlaNYC. 
Bloomberg, then in his second term and rumored to be eyeing a presidential run 
following his departure from the Republican party, framed the timing as just right, noting 
that: “our economy is humming, our fiscal house is in order and our near-term horizon 
looks bright, if we don’t act now, when?” (Lueck 2007). Bloomberg’s time sensitive 
argument was steady, especially given what New York City was experiencing at the time 
regarding transportation and the environment. At the time, traffic levels citywide 
remained at high levels reached in the late 1990s, except for a notable drop during the 
recession from 2001 to 2003 (Sustainable Streets Index 2008, 14). Since the 1990s, the 
city had seen a 13% increase in population, and a 42% increase in transit use, attributed 
to the economic boom of the mid 90s and transit related developments, such as: 
“unlimited-ride MetroCards and [the] elimination of two-fare zones,” (Sustainable Streets 
Index 2008, 15). According to the 2007 Urban Mobility Report, New York’s transit trips 
make up one in five of all transit trips in the entire United States (U.S.). In 2005, the 
subway and bus systems carried about 1.9 million New Yorkers to work (Christie 2007). 




in delays per individual (Schrank and Lomax 2007).  
For an ever-growing city, New York needed to address its transportation 
problems, and soon. Having all these vehicles stuck in traffic for an extra 46 hours per 
year meant that much more particulate matter from combustion fuel engines leaking into 
the city’s air. In recent decades, the state has been in deep negotiations and legal conflicts 
with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) surrounding National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS), including a lawsuit associated with the EPA’s denial of 
New York’s petition challenging their: “asserted failure to address cross-border pollution 
under the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision,” (New York v. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2020). Specifically, New York petitioned the EPA to discover 
facilities in other states were contributing considerably to New York’s difficulty in 
achieving compliance with the 2008 and 2015 ozone NAAQS (New York v. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2020). At the time of the congestion charging 
proposal, New York was not meeting air pollution standards in the majority of its 
counties (Environmental Protection Agency 2021). Over time, this polluted air would go 
on to cause more than: “3,000 premature deaths, more than 2,000 hospitalizations due to 
respiratory and cardiovascular causes, and approximately 6,000 emergency department 
visits for asthma in New York City annually,” (Kheirbek et al. 2011, 15).  
 By this point, New York City had seen its fair share of environmental policy 
trials. These ranged from Mayor John Lindsay unsuccessfully experimenting with 
banning private vehicles in downtown Manhattan and developing a plan to place tolls on 




private cars from 49th and 50th Streets in Manhattan during the week (Hausner 1979; 
Sulzberger 1981). The latter reduced traffic, alongside bike and bus lanes, and fewer 
parking spaces. PlaNYC, however, would put all of these policies to shame in terms of 
breadth and associated controversy.  
 Out of all 127 initiatives, one garnered the most attention from the press and 
public: congestion pricing in Manhattan. Bloomberg’s proposal called for an $8-a-day 
charge for individuals who drove into Manhattan below 86th Street on weekdays from 
6am to 6pm, which would fund transportation projects while lowering emissions and 
traffic congestion (The City of New York 2007). It would cost a smaller fee, $4, for trips 
inside the zone (Lockhart et al. 2009). Drivers would pay fees through the already 
widespread E-ZPass tolling system, by phone, online, or at certain stores (Schaller 2010). 
Bloomberg’s pursuit of this plan is traced back to earlier research done by the Partnership 
for New York City, a coalition of business leaders with the purpose of working with 
government officials to: “enhance the economy and culture of the city,” (Partnership for 
New York City 2006). In their “Growth or Gridlock?” report, the Partnership explored 
the costs of congestion itself, as well as how Manhattan’s 8.5 square miles between 60th 
Street and the Battery generates both $901 billion in the regional economy as well as the 
most congestion in the entire city (Partnership for New York City 2006, 40). Their 
recommendations included implementing a congestion charging district, using London’s 
experience specifically as an example of success in reducing traffic, air pollution, and 
generating significant funding for public transport network improvements. They were not 




London’s recent success to develop a similar scheme that could fund much-needed 
improvements to transit infrastructure.  
 Certain key aspects differentiate this case from London’s, five years prior, that are 
explored in the following sections. The proposal proceeded to the State Legislature in 
summer 2007 in order to gain pricing authority approval. A month later, pressure from 
City Hall created a 17-member Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission. At the same 
time, the City and MTA received $354 million in federal funding from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation’s Urban Partnership Program (Lockhart et al. 2009). The 
only caveat? The plan needed State Legislature approval by early late March 2008 
(Naparstek 2007). By January, the Commission developed and recommended a modified 
version of the original plan, focusing on simplifying its operation. This updated plan 
would reduce time spent in traffic by over 30%, and increase bus and subway service 
(Schaller 2010). With many supporters both in Manhattan and across the state, the 
modified plan won a 30-20 vote in the New York City Council. The charge’s final hurdle 
was passing the State Legislature, where the Republicans controlled the Senate but the 
Democrats controlled the Assembly. The Democrats blocked a vote, allowing the 
deadline for the Urban Partnership Program to pass and with it, the charge’s future.  
 Congestion charging in New York may not have succeeded in 2008, but it helped 
New York and its inhabitants realize the potential for innovative, urban environmental 
policymaking. The congestion charge represented a shift in understanding of how we can 
use our cities and streets to pursue sustainable, long-lasting benefits for those who walk 




successfully in 2019. New York City’s policy feedback loop spanned years and made 
enough adjustments to build upon its previous experiences, learn from them, and pursue 
future, successful action. New York could not fit London’s model of success, but it 
shares quite a few parallels in its Mayoral behavior, plan benefits, and political context, 
all contributing to its overall policy feedback loop. 
Policy Entrepreneurship and Issue Redefinition 
As Baumgartner and Jones famously explored, policy entrepreneurs often play the 
key role in implementing policy, as they are able to encourage public and stakeholder 
acceptability through issue redefinition. In New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
took on the role, introducing the charge proposal and attempting to shepherd it through 
implementation challenges. Introducing congestion pricing as a part of a larger, overall 
transportation strategy, PlaNYC, Bloomberg had the advantage of associating congestion 
pricing with other public benefits, ranging from less traffic to environmental and citizen 
wellbeing. This came at a cost, as congestion pricing began to overshadow the rest of the 
strategy in the public sphere, complicating its chances of success as people saw more of 
the costs and fewer of the benefits. To succeed, Bloomberg needed to redefine these costs 
through speeches, press releases, and anything else that may get the public’s attention.  
 In his “State of the City” speech, Bloomberg spoke of New York City’s greatness 
in its diversity. He emphasized the local governments’, and his own, commitment to 
helping everyday citizens and how his proposed changes will benefit them. He began 
with what he deems: “government’s most fundamental responsibility: public safety,” 




hundred years, the first statistic he cites in the entire speech. This created a “public 
safety” and “public wellbeing”-focused foundation that the Mayor would use to connect 
related issues with congestion pricing. Bloomberg continued to talk about City 
government and the importance of public feedback, emphasizing transparency and 
accountability. He spoke about the growth of small businesses and how NYC’s increase 
in population played a role in boosting the economy, but the combination added: “new 
urgency to the need for modern infrastructure,” (Bloomberg 2008). Bloomberg then 
introduced PlaNYC, his plan for New York City to become the: “world’s first truly 
sustainable city,” (Bloomberg 2008). By using the word “sustainable,” in the very first 
mention of the strategy, Bloomberg immediately set an environmental tone. He noted the 
127 proposals involved in PlaNYC and urged increased use of solar panels on 
government buildings while working with real estate developers to create greener 
buildings. Mayor Bloomberg then introduced the creation of congestion pricing, 
acknowledging that no other American city has done it before, and immediately arguing 
that it would: “help us achieve four critical, interconnected goals: reducing traffic 
congestion; raising money for mass transit; improving our air quality; and fighting 
climate change,” (Bloomberg 2008). By introducing congestion pricing right after talking 
about solar panels and shifting New York City to be more sustainable, Bloomberg 
redefines congestion pricing as an environmental issue. He does not stop there, as he 
links together short-term benefits, like less traffic for the individual New Yorker, with 
long-term benefits like cleaner air, and mitigation of climate change’s impact. This is 




finding a potential solution in a culmination of policy initiatives. 
 At first, New Yorkers remained unconvinced, his issue redefinition lacking in its 
ability to make the costs of a congestion charge seem small in comparison to less traffic 
and an improved public transit network. A few months later in November 2007, a 
Quinnipiac University poll asked whether residents would support such a measure, and 
61% of respondents opposed pricing, with 33% in support. However, when asked if they 
would support a congestion charge if the revenues went to improve public transit 
infrastructure, 60% of New York voters said yes (Tri-State Transportation Campaign 
2008). There needs to be a balance between cost and benefit for such a scheme to work, 
and Bloomberg needed to remind the public of the benefits at every chance he could. 
Widely-distributive and Associated Policies 
New York City’s congestion pricing plan was just one initiative in Bloomberg’s 
127-initiative PlaNYC strategy, but gathered the most attention and press coverage. 
Bloomberg’s plan hoped to provide policy solutions to three main challenges: “growth, 
an aging infrastructure, and an increasingly precarious environment,” (The City of New 
York 2007). With six main policy subjects: land, water, transportation, energy, air 
quality, and climate change, PlaNYC was an ambitious and comprehensive strategy to 
push New York City toward a greener future. Initiatives ranged from ensuring that all 
New Yorkers have access to nearby parks to increasing transport capacity to improve 
travel times. This thesis focuses on the Transportation section, which provides a run-
down of the main challenges faced in transit capacity, and infrastructure maintenance and 




which presides over all public transportation in New York City, and its struggle to 
expand while maintaining its current system and infrastructure.  
PlaNYC’s Transportation strategy proposed the Sustainable Mobility and 
Regional Transportation Authority (SMART), a funding allocation authority tasked with 
finishing on-hold projects and issuing bonds to: “award matching grants for projects,” by 
the MTA, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and so on. Funding would 
come through three revenue streams: primarily the revenue generated by the congestion 
charge, City investment, and an associated State contribution. An independent board 
would govern, monitoring project investments. The expected $400 million in net 
revenues within its first full year were designated for much-needed expansions and 
upgrades to transportation infrastructure. The scheme would also reduce traffic and 
subsequently lessen the pollution from vehicles, the latter helping New York City meet 
greenhouse gas reduction goals and contributing to cleaner air (The City of New York 
2007). Interestingly enough, the report notes a commitment to trial congestion pricing for 
three years. This proposed trial was rarely mentioned by Mayor Bloomberg in speeches 
and press releases, and may have helped him convince the public to try such a scheme if 
they knew there was an exit. However, given its almost non-existent mention in 
newspaper articles and interviews, Bloomberg may have not made it as much of a priority 
in communication as needed to have been in order to have a stronger effect on public 
opinion.  
The “Pilot Congestion Pricing,” section goes further into detail about the 




a short-term, immediate benefit. The PlaNYC proposal noted other international 
successes, such as London, and how it not only reduced traffic within the designated 
zone, but improved air quality, decreased delivery times, lessened greenhouse gas 
emissions, all without a “material impact on the economy, including retail activity in the 
zone in which the charge applies,” (The City of New York 2007, 88). The report then 
argues that the key to success of congestion pricing in each case, including public 
acceptance following initial reluctance, was that congestion pricing was only one aspect 
of a broader commitment to investing more into urban mass transit. The Mayor’s 
jurisdiction did not include the means to implement such a scheme, and the report 
acknowledged this as details needing to be worked out. Bloomberg needed State 
legislative approval for the right to impose a fee, fine violators, define the actual area for 
the charge and its amount, what hours it would be in operation, and more, all of which 
would need to be defined in legislation, (The City of New York 2007). This was a major 
challenge and eventually led to the scheme’s early demise, as explored in the Political 
Context section. 
The report goes on to describe congestion pricing as the path towards short-term 
benefits such as immediate reduced traffic congestion, and faster travel in Manhattan and 
surrounding boroughs. It acknowledges the importance of introducing immediate, short-
term improvements as to prove to the public that it is feasible and the benefits can make 
up for the costs imposed, such as: “bus rapid transit, improved express bus service, 
dedicated bus lanes on bridges, and new ferry service, especially to areas of the city that 




This raises an interesting idea about the divergence between London’s success and New 
York’s failure, as these short-term benefits are very similar to London’s, the main 
difference being that New York never had the chance to experience them as a first step in 
convincing the public of the scheme’s feasibility. The report continues on to describe the 
goal of reaching a “State of Good Repair,” for all of New York City’s roads, railways, 
and subway systems: “for the first time in history,” (The City of New York 2007, 13). 
This specifically alludes to Mayor Bloomberg’s policy entrepreneurship, providing proof 
of his ambition to leave a legacy as the Mayor who finally fixed New York City’s 
transportation infrastructure.  
 Even while defining these issues and short-term benefits that could come from 
decreased traffic congestion, Bloomberg’s team focused mainly on the long-term, 
environmental benefits. With such a comprehensive plan that reached across multiple 
sectors, their communication failed to strongly emphasize specific individual benefits that 
may go the extra mile and make it more believable to have a positive impact on all New 
Yorkers. New Yorkers needed proof that this cost would be balanced out by a benefit to 
their own livelihood soon after implementation. They would not want to pay the 
government more if they would not see benefits soon thereafter, even if environmental 
benefits would help them in the long-term. 
Political Context 
With a policy feedback loop in the background, the result of New York City’s 
2008 attempt at congestion pricing requires consideration of context. Mayor Bloomberg 




members of the State Senate, had decided to leave the party and become an Independent, 
rumored to have been a step in considering a Presidential run. Recognizing the pairing of 
his desire to run for President and recent re-election makes Bloomberg’s desire to enact 
an innovative, ambitious policy like congestion pricing more understandable. However, a 
huge difference between London and New York lay in mayoral jurisdiction. In order to 
have the authority to impose fines and enforce them in such a program, Bloomberg 
needed the approval of three legislative entities, multiple executive officials, and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT). These included the City Council, the State 
Assembly, the State Senate, and the Governor. Even with the support of a majority in 
City Council, the Republican-controlled State Senate, Governor David Paterson, a 
conditional agreement for funding from the U.S. DOT, as well as support from a coalition 
of 135 business, labor, and environmental advocacy groups, Bloomberg still needed 
legislative approval from the State Assembly, the Democratic-controlled lower chamber 
(Schaller 2010). Steven Polan, a lawyer associated with the MTA who worked on 
London’s policy, summarizes this difference with London, arguing that London doesn’t: 
“have a state government [that] stands between the federal government that wants to give 
out money and the city that wants to get it,” (CBS News 2007).  
The opponents to the scheme were powerful and diverse, and the conflict was 
intense, reaching multiple levels of government. Sheldon Silver, a Democrat opponent of 
the scheme and then Speaker of the Assembly, argued for a much smaller solution to 
traffic, saying that: “you can reduce traffic by 6.3% by stopping trucks from coming into 




Transportation Mary Peters contended that: “while the details of Mr. Bloomberg’s plan 
could be tweaked, it [is] unlikely that the traffic reduction goals set out by the city could 
be achieved without charging drivers to enter most of Manhattan,” (Karni 2007). Other 
opponents included elected officials and advocacy groups from the boroughs outside of 
Manhattan, all concerned about effective spending of funds and regional equity issues. 
One such issue was that due to toll offsets, drivers from New Jersey would not have to 
pay the $8 fee while neighboring residents of Brooklyn, Queens, and so on did (Schaller 
2010). These reactions were amplified by more cultural effects, such as resentment of 
“Manhattan elites,” who would in theory have a much easier time paying the fee as 
opposed to lower-income commuters. Assemblyman Mark Weprin confirms this, noting 
that: “the world ‘elitist’ came up a number of times, (Confessore 2008).  
When the proposal came to a vote in the State Assembly, Speaker Silver met the 
Democratic conference behind closed doors and later announced that the bill failed to 
gain a majority of the Democratic conference’s support and would therefore not come to 
a vote on the Assembly floor (Confessore 2008). Governor Paterson attempted a last-
minute effort but to no avail. Congestion pricing died in Albany, New York, at midnight 
on April 7th, 2008, and with it, Mayor Bloomberg’s hopes for major environmental policy 
action and what could have been a key aspect of his political legacy.  
In the end, not all hope was lost. Though not successful during his term as mayor, 
Bloomberg’s proposal did lead to the eventual adoption of a similar congestion pricing 
plan by the state legislature in 2019. What changed? In 2017, the Metropolitan 




makes repairs to critical systems as opposed to preventative measures, a practice most 
likely stemming from the intense debt the MTA carries (DiNapoli 2020). For example, 
subway cars, the oldest of which are around 50 years old and still in use, serve as the 
backbone of the New York City public transportation infrastructure, and are incredibly 
prone to breakdowns. The MTA usually only makes repairs to critical systems as opposed 
to preventative measures, a practice most likely stemming from the intense debt the MTA 
carries (DiNapoli 2020). In 2019, the charge proposed increased to be between $11 and 
$14 per car and $25 per truck during business hours (Hu 2019). $15 billion is expected to 
be raised through 2024, a sizeable number against the MTA’s $44.8 billion of debt as of 
September 2020 (Kaske 2020). The path is not clear yet, as congestion pricing was 
pushed back due to disagreements with the Trump Administration, as the scheme needs 
approval from the Federal Highway Administration, and the COVID-19 pandemic. New 
York’s plan will be one to watch in the coming years, especially following the economic 





Figure 2: Policy Feedback Loop for New York City. 
Featuring a smaller, temporal feedback loop accounting for policy developments in 2019. 
 
New York City Policy Feedback Loop Analysis 
While New York City’s attempt at congestion pricing in 2008 failed, its legacy 
lives on and with it, a better understanding of variation in environmental policy feedback 
loops. Perhaps where New York failed was a combination of these variables, more easily 
understood when placed into their own contexts, their own interactions with each other. 
Bloomberg could have focused more on traffic reduction and individual benefits, as 
opposed to larger, environmental goals. More public consultation could have taken place 
before the proposal was sent to the State Legislature, ensuring more voices to be heard as 




A policy feedback loop similar to London’s still occurred, but with an additional 
smaller internal loop acknowledging the policy’s own legacy (see Figure 2). Bloomberg’s 
policy redefinition peeks out in the PlaNYC report, as it argues that road congestion costs 
all New Yorkers money through freight deliveries taking longer, higher taxi fares, and 
more. By shifting the perspective on road congestion to be more than just an 
inconvenience, instead including numerous other costs that impact every New Yorker, 
Bloomberg attempts to not only appeal to more New Yorkers’ want for less traffic and 
faster deliveries, but also convince the public that congestion pricing is the ultimate 
solution for this problem. He takes the issue of traffic congestion primarily affecting the 
4.6% of commuters who work in the CBD and expands it to how it affects those in other 
boroughs through goods and services, as well as other boroughs’ own commute times and 
congestion’s ripple effect (The City of New York 2007).  
The public heard what Bloomberg had to say through his speeches and published 
policy proposals, determined its feasibility and how it would benefit them. 
Communication is an input that led to an output of public acceptability, which also 
received input from political context. Political opponents, such as representatives from 
neighboring boroughs, made their voices heard. With much more influence over 
implementation than opponents in London, the New York opponents posed much more of 
a threat to Bloomberg’s policy entrepreneurship and legacy. This included representatives 
from outside Manhattan, and civic groups, who argued that it: “unfairly targeted ‘the 
working person,’”(Schaller 2010). Their attempts to sway the public, especially their 




divided electorate. The public held similar, conflicting sentiments in 2019, with one non-
driver resident noting that: “Less driving, more public transportation: It’s all a positive, 
really,” while a driver from Queens countered with: “I commute into the city from 
Queens and I’m paying for tolls already, it’s enough. We’re paying enough,” 
(Domonoske 2019). This conflict is also very present in the policy-fit-to-problem aspect 
of the feedback loop. The role of the policy entrepreneur is to convince the public of a 
problem, and pair it with a solution that seems feasible and strong enough to fix it. The 
evidence behind the problem was clear, with the incredibly high rates of traffic 
congestion and insufficient transportation system, and New Yorkers were very aware of 
this as they experienced it every day. One of the ways New York City fell short was 
Bloomberg’s emphasis on environmental benefits, as opposed to immediate benefits for 
everyday New Yorkers. The public will only believe policy entrepreneurs and agree to be 
subject to a short-term cost if it is supported up by an assured, direct benefit. The 
intensity and broad scope of PlaNYC distracted from this key relationship. In a plan with 
127 initiatives, only one of which is congestion pricing, it is easy to become lost in jargon 
and feel overwhelmed. The plan itself was not accessible to members of the public, 
whether they had no interest or did not have time to read the document, the public relied 
on communication from supporters and opponents of the scheme. What they heard, was 
an immediate cost to their commute with some sort of uncertain benefit in the future. The 
public was aware of the issues the MTA faced, 1.65 billion rode the subway annually. 
Perhaps one of the variables that changed in 2019 was that there had been no positive 




A smaller, internal feedback loop helps explore this development, which includes 
the legacy of the policy proposal itself, stemming from the policy entrepreneur’s legacy. 
This reminder of previous proposals feeds into emerging new context, namely very 
similar transportation challenges faced by the MTA and New York City as a whole. 
These challenges are met by a new policy entrepreneur, in this later development 
Governor Andrew Cuomo and Mayor Bill de Blasio in a rare act of collaboration, who 
attempt to solve that similar problem. Current contextual challenges aside, it will be a 






By analyzing the specific process by which congestion charging schemes are 
successfully implemented, I provide insight to the future of environmental policies by 
exploring the imposition of short-term pain on a large sector of an electoral population in 
return for long-term climate benefits. By looking at these variables within their 
interactive contexts and through a policy feedback loop, we are better equipped to 
understand the unique position cities are in to change how we view environmental 
policymaking and how they vary from each other. 
 This is also especially timely as New York City, under Governor Andrew 
Cuomo’s leadership, was eventually able to pass a similar version of a congestion pricing 
scheme to Mayor Bloomberg’s previous plan through the State Assembly within a budget 
bill. By adding this modern dimension, my work sheds light on the future of 
environmental policymaking in cities and the roots of its success: collaboration and 
cooperation with key representatives and stakeholders through coalition building. Our 
endeavor for more sustainable, cleaner, healthier cities will be achieved through urban 
environmental policymaking with policies more radical and innovative than congestion 
charging, but for now, this is where we start. The results of my project provide key 
insights into not only how city politicians value the health, safety, and futures of their 
citizens but how individuals can make an impact on the future of their communities. 
 Beyond congestion pricing, this thesis adds to a growing understanding of the role 
of policy entrepreneurs in policymaking, specifically how mayors exercise influence 




entrepreneur, if not many. In order to implement better policy, we need to understand 
how actors respond to other variables in a feedback loop. This project also emphasizes 
the importance of perception and how to successfully communicate ideas to the public in 
order to change their perception of a policy or issue. By studying this and gaining a sense 
of how issue redefinition works, we can set higher standards for our policy makers.  
 Finally, the most significant contribution this thesis makes is one of influence. 
Policy change does not exist in a vacuum. Its development and implementation are 
multifaceted, influenced by numerous factors relating to certain key actors and their 
overall institutional and political contexts. So much of political science literature focuses 
on a few key factors in why a certain policy change occurred or didn’t, diving deep into 
those variables, but fails to account for the broader picture. While this thesis dives into a 
few key variables in a similar fashion, it also begins to outline that previously missing 
policy feedback loop in environmental urban politics, which is essentially the state of our 
world. The world is messy and complicated, and our academic explorations need to start 
accounting for that if we are to make further progress. Research needs to look for the 
most important variables as much as it needs to look for context clues, and start filling in 
the holes to help us understand the “why,” in a much stronger way.  
 In conclusion, London’s and New York City’s proposed policies were not perfect, 
nor were they meant to be. These proposals were meant to have an impact on how 
individuals interact with government, infrastructure, and policy in the real world, where it 
is messy, unorganized, and does not make very much sense sometimes. However, we can 




maps of feedback loops, understanding how event coincide with each other in order to 
take larger lessons from this intersection of people, transportation, government, and the 
environment. We need to shift our way of thinking away from looking for one big flashy 
reason why something works or doesn’t, and instead look at the whole picture, both 
broadly and in detail, to see how each piece of the puzzle comes together. Only then can 







I wanted to use this space to expand on my choice for using feedback loop 
mechanisms to describe policy change and influence. Feedback loops are common tools 
in early Earth and Environment classes to describe certain environmental processes, such 
as the carbon cycle. They usually go from one variable to the next, describing influence 
and linking that process to another. Eventually a large, interconnected system is built. I 
find it helpful to apply these ways of thinking to policy, in an attempt to apply how we 
think about the natural world to how we think about human interaction. Earth’s complex 
means of adaptation and eventually, survival, have been here long before us and will 
remain long after. To solve the kind of environmental, social, and governance problems 
we face as a global community, we need to start thinking like scientists and policymakers 
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